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The paper derives formulas for the marginal cost of public funds in a general equilibrium model.
The MCF depends on how expenditure is financed, and the paper goes through a wide range of
possibilities. Special emphasis is put on the most common functional forms of applied general
equilibrium models. The formulas are used to explain and correct results and statements in the
literature on the marginal cost of public funds. Implications for tax reform are also discussed.
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I Introduction
This paper discusses the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). MCF is input to cost benefit
analysis, where it measures what Pigou (1947) called the "indirect damage" caused by the need
to finance public expenditure. MCF is also used in tax reform analysis, as the MCF's of different
sources of financing imply a complete ranking of tax reforms (eg. Ahmad and Stern (1984)).
For these and other reasons, Mayshar (1990) has argued that MCF should be considered the
cornerstone concept of applied tax analysis.
There exists a substantial literature that measures the MCF using applied general equi-
librium modelsl, or partial equilibrium methods 2. This literature is scattered with empirical
observations of what the MCF "depends on". Ballard (1990) for instance finds that "the re-
sults indicate that the marginal welfare costs of additional tax-financed exhaustive government
expenditure are related chiefly to uncompensated elasticities" (p.275). Ballard, Shoven and
Whalley (1985) conclude that "not surprisingly, we find that the (MCF) for a given part of the
tax system is greater when the taxed activity is assumed to be more elastic." (p. 128). They
also observe that "in general, it appears that the (MCF)'s are greater for activities which face
high or widely varying tax rates" (p.128). Hansson and Stuart (1985) summarize their simu-
lations as follows: "We find that the marginal cost of public funds depends on three aspects
of the fiscal change: (i) the nature of the expenditure effects; (ii) the specific tax instruments
used; and (iii) the initial levels of the tax rates" (p. 332). Browning (1987) is skeptical to the
enterprise of using general equilibrium models to single out the important effects: "one of the
virtues of the partial-equilibrium approach is that is clarifies the. contribution (that) key pa-
rameters make to the final estimate, something that is often obscured in large-scale equilibrium
1 Stuart (1984), Hansson (1984). Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985), Hansson and Stuart (1985), Ballard
(1990), Vennemo (1991).
2Wildasin (1984), Ahmad and Stern (1984),(1990), Decoster and Schokkaert (1990).
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models" (p. 11).
Some aspects of what the MCF is all about have been clarified more rigourously. The relation
between the MCF and measures of excess burden (and the superiority of the MCF) is discussed
in detail in Mayshar (1990). Ballard (1990) stresses the difference between a "balanced-budget
experiment", and a "differential experiment", where only the former is directly applicable to the
measurement of the MCF. Stuart (1984) and others note the inappropriateness of the Harberger
formula in measuring MCF, as this formula ignores income effects. Ahmad and Stern (1984,
1990) computes an expression for MCF in the case of a commodity tax.
This paper computes expressions for the MCF for a wide range of taxes within a general
equilibrium setting, including the poll tax, wage income tax, commodity taxes, producer taxes
and tariffs. This will clarify what the MCF "depends on". I give some examples of how
simulation results reported in the literature may be explained. Further, welfare improving
tax reforms are identified. Some results are given based on general functional forms, but the
paper shows that radically more specific conclusions emerge one is willing to make assumptions
about the functional forms of preferences. The paper also demonstrates that the MCF ranking
provided by applied general equilibrium models can at least in part be explained by functional
assumptions. Finally on the relation between partial equilibrium and general equilibrium, the
expressions can be used to indicate the influence of the general equilibrium repercussions on
results and to single out the influence of key parameters.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states the model. Section 3 reviews the shadow
tax methodology of Drèze and Stern (1987, 1990), that I use to derive the expressions, and
shows how the methodology is modified for the present model and purpose. Section 4 contains
the results. Appendix A contains the derivations necessary to state the MCF's. Appendix B
contains the proofs of the propositions. In appendix C I give some observations on the relation
between shadow taxes and actual taxes in the context of the model.
2 Analytical framework
The model is a simple static general equilibrium model of an open economy. I assume market
power in exports. This is inspired by the applied general equilibrium models. These models
either are closed economy models, or assume market power in exports (most even in imports).
I leave out intermediates. There are no technical problems related to including them, but the
formulas tend to be more complicated without much of substance being added. In Vennemo
(1990) I discuss a model that includes intermediates in greater detail. The model of this paper
is a simpler version of that model.
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A brief description of the equations follows: In equation (1), bdi is the output price of good
ei is the unit cost function, taking input prices of labour d and capital qik as arguments.
I assume single output producers. There are no fixed factors in production. Price equals
(marginal and average) costs.
In equation (2), yi is output of good j and zki is the unit input coefficient for labour
(derivative of the unit cost function w.r.t. the wage paid by the producer, qi). lh is labour
supply of household h, taking consumer prices pf .pc„, the wage rate qf and lump sum income
rh as arguments. There is equilibrium in the labour market.
In equation (3), zki is the unit input coefficient for capital (derivative of the unit cost
function w.r.t. Tik). K is the exogenous supply of real capital. There is equilibrium in the
(single) capital market.
In equation (4), Po is the world market price of export good j. Export quantities depend
on the world market price.. By this assumption, the country may influence its terms of trade
vis à, vis the rest of the world. bh is the world market price of imports of good j, and the rather
abg
clumsy looking expression —L
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 Eh is imports of good j, where pfi is the tariff inclusive priceaPf	 3
of imports, and 1).7 is a price index of pfi and the price of the domestic variety, pdi. I assume
all imports are for the purpose of private consumption. This is reasonable as long as there are
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Equation (5) and (6) are the commodity balance equations. -8-1 E c4 is the domestic variety	ap a 	3
of consumption of composite j. gj is public consumption of good j. I assume for simplicity
that the public sector just purchases domestically produced goods.
The commodity balance equations may alternatively include imports. Adding and subtract-
ing imports yields (using the standard CGE convention that prices are equal to unity in the
base year of the model):
Ed; + 11JF-1-ail=	 j =1...n
where ij is imports. The bracketed term is added when j > m. When formulated this way, the
commodity balance equations apply to composite commodities.
Equations (7) to (14) define the relation between prices. tit and t are producer taxes on
labour and capital, tf and t are consumer taxes on labour and capital, t a; is an indirect tax on
the consumption composite, tdj is a tax on output for domestic use, t Li is an import tariff, taj
is an export tax, and dir is a lump sum grant to household h where eh is household specific
and 7- is a common element. An output tax is equal to a tax on output for domestic use tdj ,
and possibly an export tax taj at an equal rate. qi is the gross wage rate of consumers, qk is
gross capital return of consumers. Kh is capital owned by  consumer h. As consumers own all
the capital, ELi Kh = K.
There are 8n — m k+4 equations, and 8n —m -F k-1- 4 endogenous variables bdi, q, Tio 	3.;,
qf Paj, ql) qk, Pcid Ph, r' and one of the tax and transfer variables t , tf, tik , t;, tdi , th, tai, eh , T.
I assume government expenditures to be exogenous. The exchange rate is numeraire3 .
From the model can be obtained
3An alternative interpretation of the numeraire is to normalize one of the world import prices at unity and
have this price as numeraire. The other import prices would stand in fixed proportion to this numeraire
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where c; = EL1 , L = ELi 1h, caf = 	 ci ,cdi =	 c ei This is the government budgetPfi 	 Pdi
constraint. As producers do not invest and consumers do not save, balance in the government
budget is implied by the assumption of balance of trade. The endogenous tax rate clears the
government budget.
A closed economy version of the model is obtained by dropping the distinction between cdi
and ch , tdi and t.;, (and naturally equation (4)). The results therefore extend to the closed
economy. Dropping a tax rate as a possible financial instrument from the model is equivalent
to giving it a zero value and assuming that it cannot be endogenous. The results therefore
extend to the case where fewer financial instruments are available.
3 Shadow tax methodology
This section reviews the shadow tax (shadow price) methodology in terms of the model I
use, and defines the MCF. By definition, MCF is integrated in the cost benefit problem of
computing the change in welfare from a public project, taking account of the opportunity cost
of the project. The latter is the value of the private goods that are "crowded out" by the public
project. This depends on the workings of the economic model. The problem of computing the
change in welfare therefore makes use of a Lagrangian formulation in which the model itself is
the scarcity constraint:
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where the relation between prices and taxes is defined in eq. (7) to (14). I assume that utility
functions are additive in public goods. This implies (using Roy's identity) that public goods
do not enter the private demand or supply functions.
A shadow price is the increase in welfare related to a unit marginal increase in the associated
quantity. u.) is for instance the increase in welfare associated with a introducing a marginal unit
of exogenous labour supply. A shadow tax is the difference between a market (tax inclusive)
price, and shadow price. Define the following shadow taxes:
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Rewrite shadow prices in terms of shadow taxes as
w	 qf + —	 = +	 (24)
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Using equations (24) to (29), the Lagrangian can be written
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Following Drèze and Stern (1987, 1990), I define the bracketed term of equation (30) as the
shadow public budget constraint. iz is interpreted as the social utility (or value) of government
shadow revenue. Shadow taxes account for second best effects like the impact of one tax on
tax revenues from another tax, the implicit taxation of several factors and goods as a tax is
carried forward, etc. Shadow taxes coincide with formal taxes in the (unlikely) case of second
best optimum (see eg. Vennemo (1990)). Moreover, if the price elasticities of trade are large,
at least some shadow taxes are close to actual taxes. See appendix C for more on the relation
between shadow taxes and actual taxes in the model.
I also need the average of the welfare weighted marginal private utilities of income, which I
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denote A. A is defined
1 k OW	 k	 h 
= 
TAT h	 avhAh =
A is a natural extension to the many person case of the individual marginal utility of income,
which is often used in cost benefit analyses to normalize utilities. I use A to normalize the
welfare function.
3.1 Definition of MCF
Denote the welfare function that is maximized w.r.t the endogenous variables of the model for




This means that if 1-2,-c- > 0, welfare increases if gi is marginally increased. If	 < 0, wel-agi 	8 ,
fare increases if gi is marginally decreased. Note that when gi is changed, the endogenous
tax/transfer variable of the system adjusts in the background to ensure budget balance. The
expression fg--c. therefore captures the general equilibrium effect of increasing gi at the expense
of the endogenous tax/transfer variable of the system.
Carrying out the derivation of the Lagrangian, the effect on welfare of a marginal public
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where /VA is the ratio of social utility of income over private utility of income. Public funds has
a different value from private funds because it costs to put money in the public purse. ti/A is
thus a conversion factor between public and private funds that facilitates comparison of public
costs and private gains. Likewise, the term vj lpj is a conversion factor between shadow price
and the price used to value public purchase. If public purchases are valued in shadow prices,
this factor disappears.
When taxation is first best optimal and public purchases are valued in shadow prices, MCF
= 1. The private and public utilities of income are equal, which is to say that there is no cost
related to the collection of public revenue. When taxation is second best optimal, MCF is a
single number (greater than unity), ie. it is independent of how expenditure is financed. When
taxation is not second best optimal, both the ratio p/A and the ratio vi lp; will depend on
how government expenditure is financed. The ratio vi lpi will in addition depend on what kind
of public expenditure is being financed. For precision, I have written MCFii in formula (35),
where i indicates financing instrument, and j the kind of expenditure. To abbreviate notation,
I will however drop the subscripts on MCF in the rest of this paper.
In applied general equilibrium models, the term is most often ignored, and an estimate
of MCF is obtained by dividing the welfare cost (as it now becomes) by the change in public
revenue pi dgi .
If we considered a public project that was a perfect substitute for cash, income effects would
enter the basic formula (33) 4. The definition of MCF from eq. (35) would not change. But
an estimate of MCF can no longer be obtained by dividing the welfare change by the value of
'A formula like (33) in the case of a cash project is
dW* k
dr —  E ehh=1
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Assuming a one-person economy of course simplifies considerably.
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the project. This point, which has been obscured in parts of the literature, is emphasized by
Ballard (1990). The same argument applies of course to projects that are imperfect substitutes
for cash.
Fullerton (1991) comments that calculations of the MCF has been based on different meth-
ods for measuring welfare change. Stuart (1984) and Hansson and Stuart (1985) use the com-
pensating surplus, Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) use the equivalent variation, and Brown-
ing (1987) uses the compensating variation. The measures however coincide at the margin.
Another point that concerns the proper measurement of an item of the MCF formula, is
that the estimate will depend on the price pi used to value inputs for the project. For instance,
if pi is the market price inclusive of tax paid by the public sector, the MCF is lower than if pi
is the market price exclusive of tax. Another possibility is to use an estimate of the shadow
price as calculation price. This is often done in cost benefit analysis.
Of course, the public calculation is irrelevant for the project acceptance criterion eq. (34),
as it enters both the nominator and denominator 5 . It only has influence on how to divide the
cost between MCF and government expenditure.
The literature on the measurement of the MCF invariably has market prices in the denom-
inator (see eg. Fullerton (1991) or Ballard (1990) for explicit statements to this effect). This
procedure implies that the calculated MCF is a condensed statistic of both the cost of raising
revenue, and the more 'traditional' cost benefit consideration of correcting input prices of a
public project for market imperfections. The latter is measured by the ratio vi lpi . Interest-
ingly, this ratio cannot be measured separately from the cost of raising revenue, as vi depends
on the financing of the project. Taken at face value, the cost benefit analyst employing an
MCF estimate from the literature should not attempt to correct market prices. The necessary
5If one wants to use MCF estimates to assess potential tax reforms, only shadow prices will do as calculation
prices.
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correction is implicit in the value of the MCF. In Vennemo (1990), I observe differences of over
15 per cent in the MCF between projects.
Given a choice of financing, expressions for the ratios AR and vi lpi may be found by max-
imizing the Lagrangian w.r.t. the endogenous variables of the model, including the endogenous
tax/transfer variable. This is the procedure I use in what follows. Note that the point of this
maximization is to obtain shadow prices, and not to find the highest possible value of welfare.
The latter would be fairly uninteresting, as there is only one possible level of welfare given the
solution of the mode16 .
4 The marginal cost of public funds
4.1 Poll tax financing
Poll tax financing may not be the most popular of tax forms, but it is a key to understanding
what most of the other forms of financing are about. Moreover, modern societies do have taxes
that are similar to poll taxes. In Norway, municipal fees for sewage and waste is in this category.
Reductions in transfers are poll taxes on large segments of the population, like the elderly.
When increased public expenditure is financed by a poll tax, the poll tax is an endogenous
variable of the model, and tf-, = O.
The expression for MCF in the case of poll tax financing is summarized in proposition 1:
Proposition 1 The MCF of poll tax financing is equal to
1 viMC F = 	
1 — tbpj
(36)
where ib = is the average demand for consumption good j, and I is the
average labour supply.
6 Drèze and Stern (1987) show that maximization is formally meaningful in the context of a fully determined
model.
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This expression for MCF in the case of poll tax financing is independent of functional forms for
demand and welfare functions. The first fraction, which is equal to /VA, has the interpretation
of the sum, from one to infinity, of the initial increase in poll taxes of 1, plus subsequent
increases to compensate for lower revenue from indirect and direct taxation. (Revenue is lost
because poll taxes decrease consumer incomes). The term ib can be interpreted as the average
of shadow tax rates 4113.; weighted by the marginal propensities to spend. If shadow taxes are
positive and goods and leisure are normal goods, all income effects except the income effect on
labour supply work towards MCF being larger than unity.
It may seem paradoxical that it is the substitution of a poll tax for indirect taxation, a
non-distorting for a distorting tax, that constitutes the excess cost of the project. According
to ordinary intuition, such substitution should rather yield a gain than a cost. Part of the
answer is of course that the substitution is not of the same kind as if one lowered a tax rate and
increased the poll tax to compensate. A more complete answer, focusing on the real economics
of the issue, is that for resources of the amount p to be transferred to the government sector,
the private sector must have its income/welfare reduced by p -I- t, because it pays taxes t to the
government. Dividing p + t by p yields a number larger than one, je. the MCF is larger than
one.
The MCF of poll taxes have been estimated by Hansson (1984), Ballard (1990) and by
myself (Vennemo (1991)). In the model of Hansson (1984), MCF values are significantly below
unity. This is easily explained by proposition 1, as he assumes a negative income elasticity of
labour, and a very high tax rate on labour (of 72 per cent), which gives a great weight to the
negative income elasticity.
Ballard (1990) also obtains MCF values below unity in the case of poll tax financing. He
shows, by simulation, how the MCF of a poll tax falls as the absolute value of the labour income
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elasticity is increased. This too is supported by proposition 1. (Unfortunately, the discussion
is made in terms of the compensated labour supply elasticity).
Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) have claimed that "in general, it appears that the
(MCF)'s are greater for activities which face high or widely varying tax rates. These conclusions
are, in general, in accord with those drawn from a simple partial equilibrium model." (p. 128).
Proposition 1 implies that it actually is the shadow tax rates that matter. This will be recurrent
in the derivations later in the paper as well. In a closed economy, shadow taxes may be negative
although actual taxes are positive (see eg. the calculations in Smith (1987)). Shadow taxes
however increase in actual taxes as a first order effect, compare eq. (16) to (22).
The dispersion of tax rates referred to by the authors is not relevant as such in the case of
poll tax financing (but will be later on), what matters is the product of shadow tax rates and
income effects. If "luxury" goods face higher shadow tax rates than "necessary" goods, the
MCF will tend to be high7 and vice versa.
In the second best optimum that allows a poll tax, we may drop the hats over the t's, as
shadow taxes coincide with actual taxes. Eq. (36) then gives the single value of MCF in second
best optimum. Again, it is the repercussions on the public budget in the form of decreased
revenue from distortionary taxation that constitutes the MCF. Neither substitution effects nor
equity considerations are directly involved (but they are involved in setting the optimal tax
rates, of course).
Dropping the hats over the t's is often done in partial analysis of the MCF (see Ahmad
and Stern (1984), Decoster and Schokkaert (1990)). On that assumption, one can by the aid of
proposition 1 give a response to the following issue raised by Browning (1987): "Until it is shown
that the general-equilibrium models provide significantly different and more accurate estimates
7Note that this is irrespective of choice of welfare function. The values of the shadow taxes will depend on
the choice of welfare function, however.
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(for the same parameter values), the partial-equilibrium approach has some advantages. First,
it is easily understood, so it is less likely that critical assumptions will be obscured... Second,
it is simple for other investigators to perform sensitivity analysis by modifying the assumptions
regarding parameter values if such changes seem appropriate." (p.22). In response to the call
for a demonstration of differences between general equilibrium and partial equilibrium, one can
use proposition 1 to compare a full general equilibrium estimate to the partial one obtained by
assuming shadow and actual taxes to be equal. In Vennemo (1991) I obtain general equilibrium
MCF values from 1.07-1.24 depending on type of spending. If instead I make a back of the
envelope calculation assuming that indirect shadow taxes equalled the Norwegian VAT rate of
16.67, the MCF comes out at 1.03. Whether the general equilibrium calculation in this case is
"significantly different and more accurate" is a matter of judgement, and the VAT is in any case
not the only indirect tax in Norway. Browning's argument that general equilibrium is not as
"easily understood", need however be modified in light of proposition 1. It is also clear which
parameters that matter (to the first order), namely the income effects in demand.
4.2 Labour income tax financing
Much of the empirical literature on the MCF has focused on the effect of financing public goods
by taxes on labour income. When increased public expenditure is financed by a tax on labour
income of consumers, the tax on labour income is an endogenous variable, and Pai - = O.
At this point it is convenient to introduce an assumption on the welfare function:
Assumption 1 The welfare weighted marginal utility of income is equal for everyone.
On this assumption
1 k 	1 k
A= Tc Eßh = —k Ei3 =flh=1 	 h=1
(37)
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I make the assumption partly to be able to derive an explicit expression for in the case
of labour tax financing and other forms of financing, and partly because it is a maintained
assumption in empirical calculations of MCF.
The following proposition may be obtained:
Proposition 2 Given assumption 1, the MCF of a wage income tax is equal to
1
1 — ife ll —	 8-a IL3— 3 aqf
where ifÎ/qf is the shadow tax rate, and eu Fie l- is the aggregate labour supply elasticity.
This expression is in Ahmad and Stern (1984) and elsewhere with Î = t. As in the case of
poll tax financing, the interpretation is that MCF is created by direct and general equilibrium
indirect changes in public revenues brought about by the "initial" increase in taxation. Clearly,
it is the uncompensated rather than the compensated demand effects that matter in this respect.
We are interested in the actual changes in (shadow) revenue. This is emphasized by Ballard
(1990) and others.
Reflecting on the empirical effect of increasing the labour supply elasticity, Ballard, Shoven
and Whalley (1985) conclude that "we can generally say that the more elastic activities have
higher (MCF)'s" (p.135). Proposition 2 gives the basis for this statement. As eu increases,
the MCF also increases if the shadow tax on labour is positive. However, the cross effects to
consumption of commodities are also important, as is the level of labour actually supplied.
These factors are ignored by the authors.
Based on his small scale simulation model, Ballard (1990) concludes that, in his model, "for
any initial tax rate, the (MCF) is (unity) if the uncompensated elasticity is zero. For nonzero
uncompensated elasticities, the absolute value of the (MCF) increases as the initial tax rate
MC F = (38)
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increases." (p. 271). Proposition 2 shows that the corresponding general statement is that the
MCF is zero if the uncompensated elasticity is zero and the shadow tax rates on commodities
also are zero. For non zero uncompensated elasticities, the generalized conclusion is that the
value of the MCF increases as the shadow tax rate on labour increases.
Fullerton (1991) claims that the MCF is unity if commodities are untaxed and the actual
change in labour supply resulting from the lower wage and the general equilibrium change in
prices is zero. He writes, for instance "the condition for the marginal cost of funds to be 1.0 is
not that the uncompensated elasticity is zero, but that actual labour supply does not change."
(p. 306). If this was correct, it would be captured in the present context by the shadow
taxes of proposition 2 taking values such that MCF is unity in the event that labour supply
is unchanged. But the shadow taxes are influenced by other aspects of the model besides the
effect of price changes on labour supply. The model of foreign trade is a case in point. See
appendix C.
I will now add an assumption about the structure of preferences:
Assumption 2 Let the income derivatives be identical for all members of society.
This assumption requires that preferences are of the Gorman Polar Form. Most applied general
equilibrium models use preference structures that satisfy assumption 2, and all the models
that attempt to measure the MCF use it. Note that this assumption implies that perfect
linear aggregation is possible. Assumption 1 and 2 together therefore reduce the many person
economy to a one representative consumer economy.
The following proposition is obtained:
Proposition 3 Given assumption i and 2 the MCF of labour income tax financing is
1	 viMC 'I' 	




mi = (E PS *1 + Su) 	 (40)
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where sil = Eh S and su = Eh sill are the Slutsky substitution terms.
The part ib of the denominator of equation (39) is the "revenue effect" of Atkinson and Stern
(1974). The part m i is the "distortionary effect". Note that to obtain this separation, I had to
remove the many person dimension from the problem.
Atkinson and Stern use the formulas for optimal commodity taxation to derive the result
that the distortionary effect m i really is distortionary, ie. positive. When taxation is non-
optimal, the result does not follow. This is interesting, as it is on the basis of the distortionary
effect that Atkinson and Stern give Pigou half-right in his (general) claim that financing expen-
diture causes "indirect damage". Ballard (1990) has adopted this view, writing that "Atkinson
and Stern (1974) show that the ratio of (I) to (A) can be divided into a `distortionary effect',
which always leads towards an (MCF larger than unity), and a 'revenue effect' which can go in
either direction." (p.265, emphasis added).
For a tax reform involving a decrease in the wage income tax and an increase in the poll tax
to improve welfare, it is necessary and sufficient in a one consumer setting that the distortionary
effect really is distortionary,  je. that mi is positive. It is not strange, therefore, that the tax
reform literature has looked for conditions to ensure that mi is positive. From equation (40) it
can be shown that m i is positive if labour is complementary (in the sense 81j > 0) to all goods
with a higher proportional shadow tax, and substitute for all others. This result is in Dixit
(1975) (theorem 7). Similar sufficiency conditions are easily found, for instance is m i positive
if the shadow tax on labour is positive, and labour is complement to all goods with a positive
shadow tax, and a substitute for all others.
An alternative approach to the problem of obtaining conditions for a positive m i is pursued
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in the following. I make one more assumption on preferences and one on the shadow tax rates:
Assumption 3 Let preferences be additive in labour and a function of consumption goods, ie.
Vh = V1h , . , cnh,) — V2h (1h )
This assumption covers LES, CES, Cobb Douglas and many more preference systems. All
applied general equilibrium models computing MCF adopt this assumption. Note that as-
sumptions 2 and 3 are sufficient for two stage budgeting. Pollak (1971) describe the functions
that satisfy the two criteria simultaneously.
Assumption 4 The term .tb + if is positive, where if	 qf is the shadow wage income tax
rate.
This assumption allows some of the shadow tax rates to be negative. It even allows ib to be
negative, ie. the MCF of poll taxation to be below unity.
I can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Given assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, labour income tax financing yields a higher
MCF than poll tax financing.
An implication of proposition 4 is that a tax reform consisting of more poll tax, and less labour
income tax will always improve welfare. The importance of the proposition lies in the fact that
all applied general equilibrium models used to calculate the MCF employ assumptions 1, 2
and 3. While the purpose of these computations often is to determine empirically what cannot
be sorted out analytically, proposition 4 shows that the outcome of the computations may be
determined in structure, not by measurements actually made, but by arbitrary, untested (and
even unconscious) hypotheses chosen by the analyst for practical convenience to paraphrase
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Deaton (1981). Thus statements like "The marginal cost of public funds is estimated for
different types of tax increases. The results suggest how the portfolio of tax instruments may
be rearranged to reduce the distortionary effects of taxation for a given level of tax revenues"
Hansson (1984) (p.116) are claiming too much.
A further consequence of the assumptions made thus far should be noted:
Proposition 5 Given assumption 1,2 and 3, the MCF of labour income taxation is a function
of income effects only.
Proposition 5 is obtained because the substitution effects are functions of income effects under
the assumptions of the proposition. Hansson and Stuart (1985) write: "We also investigate
whether income or substitution effects are more important. (...) This is done by holding
the wage elasticity constant and by increasing the total income elasticity and decreasing the
substitution elasticity. (. .) The outcome is a decline in the marginal cost of public funds. This
indicates that the substitution effect matters most." But frankly, it seems rather futile to make
simulations to determine which of the income and substitution effect is the most important
determinant of the MCF, when the substitution effect depends on the income effect. Ballard
(1990), who summarizes his research the following way: 'the simulations suggest that the
(MCF) is much more related to uncompensated elasticities than to compensated ones" (p.266)
also go in this "trap". Whether the uncompensated price effect is great or small is also beside
the point when the model employs assumption 2. The heart of the matter is the income effects.
This objection applies, for instance to the claim of Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) that
the MCF is larger, the larger are the uncompensated price elasticities, and to Stuart (1984),
who perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the uncompensated labour supply elasticity.
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4.3 Commodity tax financing
When government expenditure is financed through taxation of a consumer commodity, the
formula for the MCF is similar to labour income financing, ie. it can be written
MC F = 	
1 — tb mj Pk
1	 nm • = - E	 4Sij3
i=1
As in the case of wage income taxation, general sufficiency conditions that guarantee that MCF
is lower than that of a poll tax, can be derived.
I now make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 5 Preferences over goods are additive.
All applied general equilibrium models attempting to estimate the MCF has adopted this
assumption.
Assumption 6 Preferences are not of the form
U (x) = —1n[
12hzak
E aie
This assumption is purely for convenience, in order to get a more tractable expression for mi
in the proposition below. None of the applied general equilibrium models apply this particular
preference relation.
The following proposition can be derived:
Proposition 6 Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 the MCF can be written













(1 — a k
and ai = Eh ajh can be interpreted as committed expenditure, (lc is the aggregate consumption
counterpart to ai , c = Eh ch is the sum of aggregate consumption quantities, ‘r L-di=i 3 ay
where yh is consumption expenditure and 4- is the common engel derivative, while a is a param-
eter in the preference relation for goods (see assumption 5), and ß is its top level counterpart.
is the shadow tax rate on good j.
i- is the average of the indirect shadow tax rates, with the marginal propensities to spend
out of consumer expenditure as weights. It is thus a counterpart to ib in the second stage
of budgeting. Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5 and 6 are again employed in all attempts to date
to compute the MCF in applied general equilibrium models. Among the preference systems
covered, are the CES-LES, CES-CES and CES-Cobb Douglas combinations. Proposition 6
says that if expenditure is financed by a tax that brings shadow commodity taxes closer to
uniformity, the MCF is lower than if it is financed by a tax that takes commodity taxes away
from uniformity. This is because the expression is symmetric in the j's, and ib and are
independent of j. As the .MCF's can be used as indicators of tax reforms, the implication
is that a reform towards uniform shadow taxation of commodities will increase welfare. This
extends Deaton (1987), who assumed complete additivity and an optimal poll tax.
For a commodity tax to be cheaper than a poll tax, it suffices that I is lower than and
is lower than A. The latter is about upper level uniformity. It requires that the tax factor 1' on
the consumption aggregate should be lower than that on consumption and labour combined.
The intuition is that a tax on a consumption good pushes up the price of the aggregate of
consumption goods, which is a positive thing if the price on the consumption aggregate is
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too low compared to the ideal of optimal taxation. The condition that is lower than ib, is
however not likely to hold in practice if shadow tax rates are positive, because in ib there is a
negative element consisting of the effect of lump sum income on labour supply. If a, = 0 and
a > ß, the commodity tax is cheaper than a poll tax if i5 is lower than ib. Other conditions
for a commodity tax to be cheaper than a poll tax may be inferred by inspecting mi of the
proposition.
Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) observe that "We can also see the point about high
and dispersed tax rates causing large (MCF)s if we look at the results for consumer sales taxes.
When we raise all sales and excise taxes including the very high taxes on alcohol, tobacco
and gasoline, we have high (MCF)'s. However, when we raise only the low taxes on the other
commodities, we end up with very modest (MCF)'s" (p. 136). Proposition 6 gives a precise
meaning to this observation. The point is that when lower-than-average taxes are increased
towards the average, the MCF will have to be low because of the preferences assumed (in their
case a CES-Cobb Douglas combination).
It is of interest to compare commodity taxes to each other and to the labour income tax in
order to see what is the cheapest way of financing expenditure. The result is summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, which of two taxes t; and tf that yields
the lowest MCF, depends on four parameters, a/ci and i versus a/c  and if. If a/c =
the MCF of the tax with the lowest shadow tax is the lowest. Which of a commodity tax t; and
the tax on labour income tf that yields the highest MCF depends on ai 1 ch ac l c,a i I L,a and ß.
However, if ai = (lc = a l = 0 and a = ß, and the condition #i.; < 2ib + if holds, the MCF of a
commodity tax t i; is lower than that of a tax on labour income.
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We recall that "tildes" mean shadow tax rates. If the condition 1.; < 2ib if does not hold,
the shadow tax rate of the commodity that finances expenditure is relatively much higher than
on wage income. Proposition 7 says roughly that it is possible for a commodity tax to have a
higher MCF than the labour income tax, but only if the shadow commodity tax already is this
much higher.
The key to the proposition is the fact that, given the preference structure, all goods and
(the marketed negative quantity of) leisure should be taxed at a uniform (shadow) rate at the
optimum. The latter translates to a subsidy on labour supply. In particular, we understand
why wage income taxation "always" is more expensive than commodity taxation. It is because
an increase in the labour tax implies a movement away from uniformity. For a commodity tax
to be equally "bad", it must be just as far away from the average level, je. it must be very high.
When comparing two commodity taxes, the condition 1.; < if says that it is better to increase
the lowest of two taxes. When both are below the average, this is to say that the gain from
bringing the lowest of the two towards the average, is higher than bringing the other towards
the average. When both are higher than the average, the proposition says that the harm from
increasing the one closest to the average, is less than increasing the other one.
An implication of proposition 7 is that a tax reform that brings the values of two (shadow)
tax rates -if and is7 closer together, will increase welfare irrespective of the values of other tax-
rates in the system if their rates of committed expenditure are the same. This also means that
if tax rates for some reason cannot be made fully uniform, a third best optimal solution is to
make subsets of taxes uniform. This is a further extension of Deaton (1987).
Proposition 7 contradicts the Browning (1987) view that applied general equilibrium models
are not suited for singling out the essential parameters in determining MCF. Given that the
model obeys the preference assumptions, only four parameters matter for the evaluation of
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commodity taxes, namely the two shadow tax rates, and the two parameters giving the ratio
of committed expenditure to actual expenditure. A limited number of parameters regulate the
relation between a commodity tax and a wage income tax as well. Even in the case of general
preference systems, the well defined parameters of m; in equation (41) determine the MCF of
commodity taxation in the applied general equilibrium model.
When preferences are completely additive (only one stage of budgeting or exogenous labour
supply) and if 0, and the first term of m; of equation (41) is zero. The preference
for uniformity among indirect taxes still applies. In their estimation of the MCF's of indirect
taxes for different demand systems, Decoster and Schokkaert (1990) use LES as a "benchmark".
Externalities are not accounted for. Beverages, a good with a Ï of 35 per cent and an expenditure
elasticity of 1.56, then comes out with the highest MCF value. Next is tobacco, whose Ï is 68
per cent and expenditure elasticity 0.41. At the lowest end is rent, whose Ï is only 1 per cent.
Their ranking for the LES can be explained by proposition 7. A high income elasticity of the
LES implies a low committed expenditure, which tends to amplify the effect of 1. This is why
beverages yields a higher Ï than tobacco.
4.4 Export tariff financing
So far, the formulas and propositions stated are equally true for models of closed and open
economies, and for different models of foreign trade. This is because I haven't specified what
the shadow taxes look like. The next two sections however concerns foreign trade explicitly.
The model of foreign trade is therefore important in theses sections.
When increased public expenditure is financed by an export tariff, the tariff is an endogenous
variable of the model, and
The implication is summarized in proposition 8:
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Proposition 8 The MCF of an export tariff is written
1 pa •
MCF = —11 (1— —)
ei
1.122..•where ei = _	 is the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of export demand.dpo ai
(42)
Proposition 8 concerns the phenomenon of 'tax exporting'. The intuition is that when the
country can influence its terms of trade, it can transfer some of the cost of increased public
expenditure to foreigners.
There are two aspects of this. One is that in second best optimum, the value of MCF for
a given level of public spending is lower than in a "twin" economy without such possibilities.
The second is that the MCF of an export tax may be lower than that of other instruments, if
tariffs are too low. This aspect is brought out here.
Wildasin (1987) writes the following: "This paper finds that the ability to export taxes
need not in general lower the effective cost of public spending. A simple model is developed in
which a jurisdiction optimizes the mix of taxes between those on traded and non-traded goods.
Once this structure is optimally set, the jurisdiction is indifferent between exported and own-
source revenues, and the marginal cost of public expenditure is unaffected by the possibility of
exporting" (p. 353). He then gives an example of an economy in which the MCF of a second
best optimum is the same whether or not tax exporting is possible.
Proposition 8 does not give particular support to the emphasis of this quotation. In not-
so-simple models, the MCF is in general affected by the possibility to export taxes, the more
so, the smaller are the price elasticities of export demand. Many applied general equilibrium
models adopt values of this parameter of around 1.5-28 . In these cases the MCF of an export tax
is considerably reduced compared to the situation of the small open economy. If the elasticity
8Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) use 1.4 in all sectors, citing Stern, Francis and Schumacher (1976).
The estimates of Lindquist (1990) for the Norwegian economy also yield values below 2.
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is 2 for instance, the MCF is only one half of what it is in a small open economy. This is
a significant tax exporting effect, considering that MCF of internal tax instruments normally
take on values below 2.
4.5 Import tariff financing
When increased public expenditure is financed by an import tariff, the tariff is an endogenous
variable, and -2-n4 = O. A general formula for the MCF can easily be derived on the basis of
Vbfi
this condition (and assumption 1). Results however are more specific if we add the following
assumption:
Assumption 7 The k7-function is of the CES-form.
Most applied general equilibrium models apply a CES form to import demand (ie. CES im-
port shares), justifying assumption 7. The original Armington (1969) article is based on CES
functions as well.
The following result can be derived:
Proposition 9 Given assumptions I, 2 and 7, the MCF of expenditure financed by an import






n1  = er y_ J O _ —
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where aj is the (absolute value of the) elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic
varieties, t ij is the tariff rate t fj I p fj , s = b;c, is the income allotted to purchases of commodity
ac_f .j,and a
82
 and -es L— are the (linear) income derivatives of the varieties.
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Proposition 9 says that financing by means of an import tariff yields a lower MCF than financing
by means of a tax on the aggregate commodity if taxes on domestic and foreign varieties become
more uniform as a result. The impact on the MCF depends on the elasticity of substitution
between the two varieties. This parameter regulates the quantity implication of increasing the
tariffs within the composite. If it is large, the more elastic is the consumption composite index,
and the more is there to gain from a reform in the direction of more uniform taxation.
When increased public expenditure is financed by a tax on a domestic variety of some good,
the tax is an endogenous variable, and O. An expression that is symmetric to eq. (43) is
obtained.
4.6 Labour and capital input tax financing
When increased public expenditure is financed by a tax on the labour input of some industry,
the tax is an endogenous variable, and P-Kat, = O. An expression for the MCF in the general case
(only given assumption 1) can easily be found by combining Mat, = 0 and = O.abco
I find it more fruitful to pursue the implications of the following two assumptions:
Assumption 8 The industry in question is non-exporting.
Assumption 9 The production function is CES.
Assumption 8 is purely for convenience, as there are no technical problems to adding on exports.
Assumption 9, although restrictive, is satisfied by all but one (my own) of the attempts to
measure the MCF by means of applied general equilibrium models. As might be guessed,
assumption 9 allows us to derive another "level" where the deviation from uniform taxation is
important. All of the instances of preferences for uniform taxation is contained in the following
proposition:
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Proposition 10 Assume assumption 1 - 3 and 5 - 9 hold. The MCF of a labour input tax will
then be
MC F = [1 — tb 
	1 — ß
(1 — 5 .9(1 —ci 	 Ica  1 — eic j 
1 — a
N.;
— Idj ) + aik(iz — tiVapei
where iz =  
Proposition 10 shows the issue of uniformity to enter at four levels. First, the labour input
tax cet.par. lowers the MCF if the labour input tax is lower than the capital input tax. The
increase in costs is carried over to an increase in the shadow tax of the domestic variety, which
reduces the MCF if the shadow tax on the domestic variety is lower than the tax on the foreign
variety. Third, the shadow tax on the composite commodity increases, which decreases the
MOE if the shadow tax on the composite commodity is lower than the weighted average of
tax rates. Finally the price of the composite commodity is increased, which is positive in the
(unlikely) case that the aggregate tax on the composite is lower than the wage income tax. The
conclusion is: If the labour input tax is to be used, find an industry in which labour is taxed
more lightly than capital, and the shadow taxes on all stages of demand are lower than the
(weighted) average. The increase in the labour input tax triggers a row of movements towards
uniformity,. which each contributes to the MCF going down. Only the impact on the price
of aggregate consumption contribute to the MCF going up. Note how once again only a few
parameters are directly relevant for the size of the MCF.
Hansson and Stuart (1985) table 5, estimate MCF of a factor tax keeping the tax on the
other factor constant. The table shows that increasing a tax is cheap as long as the other factor
is more heavily taxed, but not if the other factor is more lightly taxed.
Ballard (1990) performs sensitivity analyses that suggest that "the elasticity of substitution
in production has only a small effect on the results. If we move from a substitution elasticity of
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0.6 to 1.2, the efficiency effects previously reported are changed by less than 1 cent." (p.271)9 .
This is because he considers a labour income tax, in which the elasticity of substitution plays
no direct role in determining MCF. Proposition 10 reveals that the elasticity of substitution in
production however has a direct influence on the size of MCF when one considers an input tax.
When capital input is taxed, the formula is symmetric to that of labour input.
4.7 Combinations of taxes
So far in the paper, I have examined the effects of financing expenditure through increasing
one tax at a time. However, many of the applied general equilibrium simulations of the MCF
increase several taxes at a time to finance expenditure. I state the results for some combinations
of tax rates in proposition 11:
Proposition 11 Under assumptions 1 and 2, the MCF of a fully comprehensive VAT is
v •
MC F =  Al 
1 - tb — am i pi
where a is the labour income share. Generally, a proportional increase in labour taxes on an
industry level is equal to increasing the wage income tax. A proportional increase in capital
taxes on an industry level is equal to a poll tax. An increase in labour and capital taxes of an
industry is equal to increasing the tax on output of the industry. An increase in taxes on labour
and capital in all industries is in the closed economy version of the model equal to an increase
in all consumer sales taxes. In the open economy version, it is equal to an increase in output
taxes.
Some of the statements of proposition 11 are intuitive, even self-evident. Yet they seem to have
gone largely unnoticed in the literature on the empirical measurement of the MCF. Ballard,
9See also Hansson (1984) Hansson and Stuart (1985), who find almost no effect in their "differential"
experiments.
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Shoven and Whalley (1985) for instance, state that "with a labour supply elasticity of zero,
the labour taxes at the industry level cause relatively small amounts of marginal distortion"
(p. 135). This is not surprising, considering that we are in that case talking of a poll tax.
The result on the MCF of VAT financing implies that a tax reform where the VAT is
decreased and the lump sum tax is increased, will increase welfare if m i is positive. This
extends theorem 3 in Dixit (1975), who assumed a single factor of production.
5 Conclusions
The paper has presented computations of the marginal cost of public funds under different
assumptions regarding the way expenditure is financed. Assumptions of preferences and tech-
nology commonly made in the literature measuring the MCF were also taken into account.
The results of the paper yield a number of implications that are summarized here in a
compact form. I do not repeat the assumptions required for each result, but refer to the
propositions where they are stated the first time:
• On the ranking of tax reforms
1. A poll tax yields a lower MCF than a wage income tax (proposition 4).
2. A commodity tax yields a lower MCF than a wage income tax (proposition 7).
3. A VAT increase yields a lower MCF than a wage income tax, but a higher MCF
than a poll tax (proposition 11).
4. A commodity tax may yield a lower MCF than a poll tax if the initial commodity
tax rate is lower than the aggregate tax rate on consumption (proposition 6).
5. Which of two commodity taxes that yield the lowest MCF depends. on the shadow
tax rates and the rates of committed consumption to actual consumption for the
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two goods (proposition 7).
6. An import tariff yields a lower MCF than a commodity tax on the same commodity
if the import tariff is lower than the shadow tax on the domestic variety (proposition
9).
7. In a non-exporting sector, a factor tax yields a lower MCF than an output tax if the
initial shadow factor tax is lower than the tax on the other factor (proposition 10).
8. An export tax yields a lower MCF, the lower is the export price elasticity (proposition
8).
9. When preferences are two level, sub-additive and engel derivatives are identical across
households, a tax reform in the direction of making commodity taxes more equal will
increase welfare. When two commodities have the same committed expenditure (eg.
zero), a tax reform that makes the taxes on the two goods more equal will increase
welfare. These results even hold for one level additive preferences.
• On other matters
1. When an MCF value taken from applied general equilibrium models is used as input
to cost benefit analysis, costs should in principle be assessed in market prices.
2. In applied general equilibrium models, the MCF is a function of income effects only,
as compensated price effects are functions of income effects. More generally, the
MCF is a function of uncompensated price effects.
3. Shadow taxes, and not actual taxes enter the formulas for the MCF.
Perhaps the most important assumption behind the results on the MCF (ie. tax reform)
rankings, is the utilitarian assumption that "a dollar is a dollar".
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Given this and the other assumptions, the paper has shown that a number of results on the
set of desirable tax reforms can be stated on the basis of theory alone. Another merit of the
paper is that it clarifies what the MCF "depends on" in general equilibrium, something which
reduces the need for sensitivity analyses, illuminates the relation between general equilibrium
and partial equilibrium, and reduces the tendency of applied general equilibrium modelling to
treat the model as a "black box".
33
Appendices
A First order conditions of the Lagrangian
A.1 First order conditions that always hold
The following relations will hold no matter the financing:
aL k 	alf	 In A aci aV 	 A al, al);	 abs;
= E –clioh—i- -1- p, E e ---.7 + q — + c•
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where the bracketed term only applies when j is an exporting industry. Rewriting the equation
yields (using the Slutsky definition, the definitions of th, di and (where relevant) iaj, Young's
and Euler's theorems on the second derivative of b;, and dividing through by ci and IL and
(where relevant) acii/apai) io
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Two more relations that always will hold are
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10The ":" sign means "the left hand side equal to zero is equivalent to..." .
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A final set of equations that always will hold is
	ayj 
= j4îzi -Fijkzki iyi ) = 0	 (A6)
A.2 First order conditions of which one will hold
In addition to the relations that always hold, one of the following relations will hold:
A.2.1 Endogenous poll tax
ac4 arhOL 	k h arh	 n	 k	 A k mh arhE




Assuming	 is  constant across h (a pure poll tax) and rearranging yields (dividing by k and
using the definition of )  as Eh Ph I k)
aier .A+it t ic. aCli 4. ic_aï 1 = o[ 	 ] (A8)
j=i 3 ar	 1 ar "--
where the bars indicate average values.
A.2.2 Endogenous wage income tax
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A.2.3 Endogenous commodity tax
ÖL:	 k	 n
= E —oh	 4=r, + c; —aLat .; h=1	 i=1 UP;	 ap;
Using the Slutsky equation and dividing by p yields
(All)
nE. 4s ij ifsu 	  = 0	 (Al2)
i=1
A.2.4 Endogenous labour input tax
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Dividing by p yields
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A.2.5 Endogenous capital input tax
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A.2.6 Endogenous export tariff
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A.2.7 Endogenous import tariff
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A.2.8 Endogenous tax on domestic varieties
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Using the same procedure as for an import tariff yields
B Proofs of the propositions
The proofs of the propositions follow fairly directly from the first order conditions of the max-
imization. The idea is to obtain an expression for p/A that can be substituted in the general
formula for MCF p j •
B.1 Proof of proposition 1
Use eq. (A8), which by a rearrangement of variables is written as
=	 1 — ib)	 (B1)
	OZ.	 . aï
Ib = E	 tc—
	j=1 3 ar 	 ar
An expression for p/A follows by a rearrangement of variables.
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B.2 Proof of proposition 2
Rewriting eq. (A9) given assumption 1 yields
= 11
[1
n Ac aCi— — Et .—•	 IL —An C	 AnC
	t/Y 	 j=1	 ‘-'11
(B2)
Noting the definition of ell as —8L It- an expression for p/A follows by a rearrangement ofeqf L 7
variables.
B.3 Proof of proposition 3
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Note that the average Engel derivative is equal to the identical Engel derivative under assump-
tion 2.
B.4 Proof of proposition 4
Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 imply that (proposition 5 below)
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Wage income taxation therefore yields a higher MCF than that of poll taxes if rni is positive.
Inserting for sji and su in m 1 yields
al k
771 =	 E n ivb
L h_1
(B6)
Under assumption 4, rni is positive ( is negative because of GPF, and rj is a positive constant).
B.5 Proof of proposition 5
Under assumption 1 and 2 the MCF of a wage income tax is (proposition 3),
MCF =
1





The task is therefore to show that the substitution terms s 7 1 and su in m 1 are functions of
income derivatives.
Since top level preferences are additive (assumption 3), it follows from equation 3.4, p. 138
in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) that
su	
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It follows from assumption 2 that (compensated) demands for commodities have the form






where Ah and P are homogenous of degree one price indices of p ... pc„, and Ch is the quantity
index of consumer goods.
Given this specification, the effect of a change in qf on cl} must come through Ch. In
particular,
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where 4/ is the Slutsky derivative between labour and total consumption. As top level prefer-
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The latter is a property of GDF demands. Thus sil and Su / are functions of income derivatives.
B.6 Proof of proposition 6
Under assumptions 1 and 2 the MCF is (analogous to proposition 3)
MC F =
1	 vk





The task is to show that mj takes the form indicated in the proposition.
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Under assumptions 2, 3, 5 and 6, compensated demands are written in the following special
versions of the GPF forms:
	h 	 h	ci 	 °P h=
h = a /c' +





c 	 c 	 0-11-0 0-where the low level price index P is one of the two functions Hips/ or [Ei b 3. pi 
1 	
, and
the same for the high level price index T. We recall Ch to be the quantity index of consumption
goods, and	 to be total utility.
The slutsky derivatives corresponding to these equations are
82P  h ap .9241 ap vh=	 (B17)
Opfail c 4- apf ap2 op.; Y
492P h 813 82 41 op vh




Calculating these expressions for the two classes of admissible functional forms for the price
index yields
a2p h = p Ch aCiaci
(B20)
aPfaP; c 	1 — a Oy Oy
a2p _ ....p C	 3 (i. .... pi_)h 	(B21)
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where we recall yh be consumer expenditure and -82i the common engel derivative. Likewise '22 isey 	 ar
the common engel derivative for the consumption quantity index and 11  is the common labour







to which utility function is assumed. In the LES system for instance, a is zero. In the CES
system, 1/(1 — a) is the (absolute value of) the elasticity of substitution.
We now possess the specific forms of the slutsky terms corresponding to the assumed pref-
erences. Inserting in the general expression for mi and some algebra yields desired expression
for mi .
B.7 Proof of proposition 7
Under assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 the MCF of a commodity tax is (proposition 6)









The first part of the proposition follows from comparing the MCFs of two different commodity
taxes tf and t; (and for the same kind of project), and noting that the only parameters not
present in both expressions are those mentioned in the proposition.
The second part is obvious by inspecting the MCFs of two commodity taxes ts; and
The third part follows from rewriting the MCF of a wage income tax (under assumptions
1, 2, 3 and 6). It can be written like eq. (B5) with
M1 = 	 L (tb
1 —
B26)
The fourth part follows by noting from the assumption that a i is zero, the MCF of a wage
income tax can be written as eq. (B5) with
1	 -
m i = 	
1 — f3
(tb (B27)
Under the assumptions of the proof, the expression mi for commodity tax financing reduces to
1




The MCF of commodity tax financing is lower than that of wage income tax financing if
mi > —m 1 . This implies the condition.
B.8 Proof of proposition 8
Rewrite eq. (A18) as follows
1
vi = pai(1 —
and insert in eq. (35).
B.9 Proof of proposition 9
Rewriting eq. (A20) under assumption 1 and 2 yields
oc
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Assumption 7 implies that preferences for varieties belongs to the class of additive GPF func-
tions. The substitution terms of these functions have the form described in the proof of propo-
sition 6, that is
If.ta
n it; =  3abacs	 tfi--a---acsh idj aaesdj — tu )
ani
where S h is the income allotted to purchases of composite commodity j, and cri is the absolute
value of the elasticity of substitution. The Engel functions are identical in CES.
Recalling that if	 = abc in GPF preferences, the proposition is obtained.3 vs
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B.10 Proof of proposition 10
Rewriting eq. (A2) under assumptions 1 and 8 and inserting for yi Oi from eq. (A14) yields 
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From proposition 6 it follows that under assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6:
m; =
(1 — EL)(1 — )
(i
cj 
( 	 5)1 — a
(B33)
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(B34)
To obtain an expression for o observe that the substitution terms are the same as for the
function LI in the proof of proposition 9 above (only the names are different). One therefore
immediately obtains (recall that  Yi = ci under assumption 7, and z/- = Q-e)3 	 aqi
+ii &kJ
0. =.1	 81); 1 a ei	 k aej — 61) (B35)
B.11 Proof of proposition 11
VAT financing
Assume commodity prices can be written




where t is the (ideal) VAT rate. VAT financing implies Sf. = 0 ie.
n k	
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and the homogeneity of demand and supply functions,
n 	ad./nc. 	rh	 =
r 3 h,nç ' /1	 c ' arh3=1	 F
(B38)
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In the general case, not assuming 1 and 2, we note that (1 t)V- qf	 E rha = 0, which
implicitly determines the MCF.
Industry level tax increase on labour
Define







 ic—a—ri (Yi 0i)z/i1 =
Note that gf =	 . Combining eqs. (B44) and (A4), we find
O	 (B44)
k	





This is the condition for frce = O. In other words, increasing all producer tax rates on labour
input is equal to labour income tax financing of consumers.
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Comparing eqs. (B47) and (A5), we see that
k	 n	 hE Khfl i, 	 E E Kh acij ic Kh aih _ K
h=1	 j=1 3 h=1 	Or 	1
	 arh=1
= o	 (B48)  
This is to say that the tax increase is equal to a poll tax in which households are taxed according
to their share of capital.
Taxing labour and capital in an industry
Define
	qi = (qi -F 4)(1+ tj)	 (B49)
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yi =-0i
Inserting the result Yi = —0; in equation (Al) for -A4-0 = 0, we observe, using eq. (11), that
84 ;	 -2plies -4- = 0 if j is a non-exporting industry, and else e; 	-- O. The interpretationabd4
is that a tax on all inputs is equal to an output tax, which is equal to tdj if j non-exporting,
and else equal to a tax on domestic consumption and exports.
Taxing labour and capital in all industries
Define
= (qi +4 ) (1 + t) qk = (qk + tik )( 1 + t)
We find (using Eulers theorem repeatedly):
aL n
= DY • + 0 ')bdi =0at	 i=1 	 3
(B54)
(B55)
Adding together	 over sector and using this result, we find that 19,.-ç-at = 0 implies 7m. 84
ab47	 La3=1 utdi
84 =m+1 i4-s 	0. If the economy is closed, the expression boils down to E•P--c- = o ie. a3=	 ato	 3 etc
simultaneous increase in all consumption taxes. If not, it is equal to a simultaneous increase in
all output taxes.
C Shadow prices, shadow taxes and formal taxes
The goal of this appendix is to obtain expressions for shadow taxes in terms of actual taxes.
This requires knowledge of the relation between shadow prices and actual prices. If i is an
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exporting industry, we know that (from (A3))
Paj	 Cj
bcij — VJ =	 - taj = dj
ei 	
(C1)
If ci is small as compared to aj and hi is close to zero (recall that it is zero in non-exporting
industries) or at least not too negative, di will be positive.
The shadow price is approximately equal to the output price if di is approximately zero.
This is the case if ei is large (the industry is close to being perfectly competitive) and/or taj is
sufficiently positive.
If ei is small (approaches unity), or aj is small as compared to ci , the shadow price of
exportables is approximately determined by domestic forces only, through hi .
Now use eq. (A6), which can be written as
bdi — vi =	 — w)zlj (q)! — p)zki 	(C2)
Given the shadow prices on outputs and factors, vi,co, p, taxes t and tik and the unit input
demands z/j and zki , equations (C2) are n equations in the n -I- 2 variables bcij,0 and qk. We
need two more equations to explain market prices in terms of the other variables.
Pick two exporting industries (at random), and indicate them by 1 and 2. Two expressions
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where k1 and k2 are capital intensities.
These expressions depend on the d's and (through the h's) on the prices and quantities
of the whole system. A useful benchmark case is found by assuming ti t 2k = tk , it t? =
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t,	 = -4 -z ,	 =	 (eg. if ei is very large or if there are export taxes or output taxes of thezl 	Z12
required size). In that case,
=	 t = = q?
	
(C5)
P = qk tk = =
	 (C6)
ie. the shadow factor prices are equal to the factor prices paid by the two industries.
This finding allows us to derive the shadow prices of the non-exporting industries as well.
From eq. (C2), b4; — zì = — t i)z/i (tik — tk )zki , ie. the deviation between market and
shadow prices depends oh whether factor taxes are higher in non-exporting industries than in
exporting.
A tentative conclusion is that in non-exporting industries, shadow prices and market prices
of outputs generally are fairly close unless the non-exporting industries are taxed markedly
different or the economy is far from the small open type. In exporting industries, shadow prices
generally tend to be lower than market prices.
In terms of tax rates a conclusion is that in non-exporting industries, shadow commodity
taxes tend to be fairly close to formal commodity taxes. In exporting industries, shadow
commodity taxes are generally lower than the formal taxes. The same reasoning applies to
taxes on domestic varieties. Any import tariffs will increase the shadow commodity taxes.
Using eq. (C6), the shadow consumer wage income tax is
. if = tf t i 	(C7)
ie. the shadow consumer wage income tax is equal to the formal tax plus the labour input tax
of the representative exporting industries.
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The shadow input taxes tend to be smaller than their market equivalents. Using eq. (C6),
(C8)
(C9)
In the two representative exporting sectors, the shadow input taxes are zero.
The shadow tax on exports is di, which I have argued is positive.
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